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Ukrainian media produced a number of ironical and poignant headlines when
commenting on the split-up of the major pro-Kuchma faction of the parliament. Yet, the
split-up surprised no one: the end of the short-lived faction of the Yedyna Ukraina was
predicted by both politicians and observers.
Meanwhile, there is still a question: to what extent was the political «marriage of
convenience» a success? Did the faction really exist for as long as needed for the forces
that had created it, even though some of the functions it had been meant to perform were
fulfilled only partially? Anyway, the political consortium of the «parties of power»
collapsed.
The first publicly displayed symptoms of the future break-up were seen even before
Vladimir Lytvyn became the Speaker. Leader of Trudova Ukraina Serhiy Tihipko spoke
about certain plans that went beyond the faction framework. On May 21, governor of the
Donetsk region Viktor Yanukovich announced in Donetsk that a group «Regions of
Ukraine» would be formed within the «Yedyna Ukraina». The process evolved slowly
but steadily, and the political marriage of convenience was broken for considerations of
convenience.
On May 18, it was announced that a session of the Yedyna Ukraina officially decided to
re-organize the faction into a block of factions and groups. According to Tihipko, the
Yedyna Ukraina was supposed to serve as the basis for the factions of the People’s
Democratic Party, the Regiony Ukrainy, the Trudova Ukraina, the Agrarnyky Ukrainy,
the «Industrialists and Entrepreneurs», the «Narodovladdya». It was also announced that
the new factions would undertake all obligations that the «Za Yedynu Ukrainu!» election
block had pledged to their voters to perform, and that the leaders of the new factions
would sign an agreement on cooperation.
On May 20 the «transformation» the Yedyna Ukraina was finalized with the formation of
even more factions and groups than originally expected. The faction produced seven
smaller factions and groups, and a number of new leaders. For instance, the 17-strong
group of «Narodovladdya» («the people’s power») got four co-chairmen: Bohdan
Hubsky, Serhiy Osyka, Oleg Bespalov and Lev Mirimsky.
Trudova Ukraina and the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs formed their own 38-
strong faction. It will be led by Serhiy Tihipko and a few other authorized
representatives. The agrarian lobby of the former megafaction formed the group of
«Agrarii Ukrainy», led by Kateryna Vashchuk. Another faction of 18 MPs was formed by
the People’s Democratic Party, chaired by Valery Pustovoitenko.
The faction Regiony Ukrainy was joined by 35 MPs and led by Raisa Bohatyriova. Some
time before a leader of the Donetsk influence group Volodymyr Rybak argued that «the
banners of the Party of the Regions» could gather «about 60 persons. It is possible that
they will form not one faction but two» (Den, June 8, 2002). Actually, he was right. The
other Donetsk group, «Evropeiskiy Vybir», was joined by 15 MPs. The group will be led
by Valentyn Savytsky and Vasyl Potapov. Most of the members of the group are
members of the Party of the Regions, or rather, of the party of one region – Donetsk.
Another new group in the parliament, the Demokratychni Initsiatyvy, includes 16
members and is lead by Stepan Hawrysh.
So far ex-leader of the ex-megafaction Volodymyr Lytvyn has not shown any anxiety
about the split-up: «We do not need the megafaction, we need results». The statement
sound symptomatically, for Lytvyn’s own result, the position of the Speaker, was
received through tremendous pressure on MPs. After the procedure, the faction and its
allies looked like a squeezed lemon.
Notwithstanding the gains (the seats of the Speaker, the Vice Speaker and heads of four
parliamentary committees) and saved positions (the Prime Minister and some members of
the government), the question is whether all purposes of the megafaction, both overt and
hidden, have been fulfilled. In that context it’s worth noting the declared tasks of the
block. For instance, the block’s pre-election declared commitments stated that «the goal
of the formation of the block is the formation of a centrist majority in the next
[parliament] with the further establishment of a responsible government, able to carry out
a consistent policy, aimed at achieving sustainable development, the growth pf the gross
domestic product, the steady rise of the standards of living of the population.» Moreover,
«the difference of the block «Za Yedynu Ukrainu» from other pre-election alliances is the
practical readiness of individuals that take part in the elections within the block, to fulfill
their commitments. That has been repeatedly proven by their work in the field of state
governance…»
However, that optimistic text was written when the voting results were not known yet.
After March 31, when it became obvious that the block had managed to receive only 35
seats, the declaration began to look bluff. Yet, later on the faction grew immensely
through attracting independent MPs who had won their seats in majoritarian
constituencies. The instruments of effective recruitment included the use of pressure and
threats like tax inspections of the MP’s businesses, etc. After Lytvyn’s election, though,
there was no need to keep the faction together and little motivation for majoritarian MPs
to stay in – particularly when the de facto approval was received from the top decision-
making level. As the megafaction did not leave much room for freedom of majoritarian
MPs, their sense of political survival encouraged them to promote the split-up.
Commenting on the processes within the faction, one of the leaders of the Donetsk clan
Volodymyr Rybak argued, «Obviously, we have or own opinion on very many issues.
Naturally, it does not always coincide with the opinion of the leadership of the Yedyna
Ukraina. For instance, someone wants excessive centralization in dealing with
administrative or economic issues. We disagree with such approach, for [we] are
supporters of decentralization, provision of more freedom locally» (Den, June 8, 2002).
The non-democratic format of the faction made it more difficult to individual MPs to
pursue their lobbying interests. Moreover, ambitions of many of the faction members
were not fulfilled during the division of the parliamentary committees as a result of the
trade-off with the election of Lytvyn. After long negotiations, the faction received
leadership of only four committees: the Committee for Finance and Banking (Serhiy
Buriak), the Committee for Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear
Safety (Andriy Kliuyev), the Committee for Foreign Affairs (Dmytro Tabachnyk), and
the Committee for Transport and Communications (Valery Pustovoitenko). The list
shows that far from all aspirations of the faction’s party segments had been taken into
account. The Donetsk elite did not get much – apart from the position of the Vice
Speaker Vasyliev and the head of the Fuel and Energy Commission.
The formation of a steady majority, even at the expense of majoritarian MPs, was not an
option given the election results. The clone of the Russian «Medved» («the Bear») or the
«Yedinstvo» («the Unity») in the Ukrainian parliament did not work due to political and
mental specifics, and failed to produced the desired results as well as other Russian
election PR projects. The election block «Za Yedynu Ukrainu», the founding entity of the
faction, looked exactly like a government-sponsored election project. It contained a wide
range of state officials whose names on the list could make many a bureaucrat to bow
respectfully. One of the purposes of the block was to ensure that President Kuchma and
the government continue to enjoy stability and immunity. «The form of consolidation of
administrative, political, business and regional elites under Leonid Kuchma for the period
of the parliamentary elections,» argued analyst Volodymyr Fesenko when describing the
block. The definition is rather indicative of the causes of the alliance and the methods it
used for success. The block’s victory in recruiting the MPs came through the use of the
notorious «administrative resource», the specific Soviet-style practice of the
government’s interference with the election process by means of distribution of
resources, controlled by bureaucrats of different levels. The block set the records of
manipulation and power abuse during the recent election campaign.
The election block «Za Yedynu Ukrainu» never used to be a coherent political entity with
a clear common ideology. In fact, the block included several rivals who pursued different
interests in the political business. The block had representatives of rival regional interest
groups that could be seen as competitors rather than partners. Therefore, the split up has
come as a natural step. As some point strategic election tasks, multiplied by the
president’s order allowed the Ukrainian political elite for a certain periods of time to
forget their own political and nomenclature ambitions. The understanding, though, was
not an easy thing to reach.
The agreement on the formation of the block was signed by leaders of five political
parties on December 15, 2001. Before that there was a line of various declarations about
the intention to create an election block of the PDP, the Agrarians, Trudova Ukraina and
the Party of the Regions, and the statement of the leaders of the PDP, Trudova Ukraina
and the Party of the Regions to create a single party. The declarations were never
fulfilled, though some efforts to do so did take place. On March 29, a couple of days
before the polling day, fourteen political parties signed a declaration on creation of the
party «Za Yedynu Ukrainu» based on the election block. The document was signed by
the «heroes» of the recent split-up: the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Trudova
Ukraina, the Agrarian party, and the Democratic Union. However, the costly initiative
(the congress was attended by almost 1,000 participants) proved to be nothing but yet
another PR action and a signal to local officials as to who was in charge of the show.
Recently, leader of the PDP Valery Pustovoitenko announced that his party did not intend
to join any form of the party alliance based on the block. «We have a party of our own –
and we will carry on working,» he said (www.for-ua.com/, June 20, 2002). Apparently,
the attitude is shared by other members of the political consortium.
Not only the majoritarian MPs sought to split away from the megafaction, but the
partisan MPs also did not live up to their pledges. The reduction in numbers of the PDP is
particularly visible. Some time ago a party activist Anatoly Tolstoukhov argued that the
would-be faction could have at least 27 members of the mother block. By now the faction
lost 10 members who arrived to the parliament through majoritarian constituencies.
According to Pustovoitenko, those people stayed in regional groups because they
performed order of their governor. Apparently, the governor who make orders to MPs is
the head of the Kharkiv regional state administration and former presidential chief of
staff Yevhen Kushnariov.
The faction also became a donor for other factions. As rumor has it, three members of the
former megafaction, Valery Horbatov, Igor Franchuk and Oleksandr Tsarenko are likely
to join the SDPU(o) – which is hardly surprising given the Crimean political origin of the
former two.
Each of the leaders of the new factions and groups has his or her own political history,
membership in and leadership of different political parties. It looks like nowadays every
MP strives to form a party of his or her own. The real initiators of the new factions is,
however, outside the parliament. For instance, some analysts suggest that the
«Yevropeisky Vybir» emerged due to ambitions, possibilities and plans of chairman of
the State Taxation Administration Mykola Azarov. The Demokratychni Initsiatyvy is
described as «the Kharkiv project».
The split-up of the Yedyna Ukraina into minor factions and groups may suggest that the
Cabinet of Ministers is likely to come under stronger and more varied pressure – which is
unlikely to add to Kinakh’s government’s stability. It is likely that the parliament will
soon have more factions with their own interests. On the one hand, the process can be
defined in terms of moving towards better faction management. Small factions are more
manageable, they have more self-governance and independence and, hence, more
opportunities to fulfill one’s goals. «It is impossible to run a 180-plus faction. Just
imagine: they gather in one room. The chairman asks: shall we support this decision?
Everyone says «yes, sure!» And they leave. No discussion whatsoever,» noted
Volodymyr Rybak.
Under the circumstances, the other megafaction, Nasha Ukraina, may only be happy that
the process of split-up was started by somebody else. According to some observers, the
secessionist tendencies developed in parallel in both of the megafactions.
There is another issue that is rooted in the lack of political responsibility and
accountability. Generally the Ukrainian legislation, the election law included, is rather
liberal regarding the split-up processes in parliamentary factions and blocks that won the
elections. That is why the previous parliament had many of the factions that did not exist
during the 1998 elections. By the end of its service, the 3rd parliament had the factions of
Trudova Ukraina, the Vidrodzhennya Regioniv and the Regiony Ukrainy, but did not
have the faction of the Progressive Socialists. The new parliament seems to have
inherited the traditions. Yet, no one calls for political responsibility to those who voted
for the block in general but not for the pre-election project. It is likely that the leaders of
the «daughter factions» will sign yet another agreement with yet another declaration
about consolidation. And the story will be played again…
